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242 The severity of the global ﬁ nancial crisis continues to spread consequences to 
various developing regions across the world that managed to dodge the ﬁ rst blow. 
The reason they did so was the relative underdevelopment of their ﬁ nancial sy-
stems and a relatively lower level of integration with the most developed coun-
tries, where the housing market started to collapse taking with it the interdepen-
dent ﬁ nancial system and consequentially a major part of the real sector. South 
Eastern Europe was one of these unfortunate regions that, although avoiding the 
initial downturn (a rapid decrease of GDP started in 2009, although in developed 
countries this had already begun in the ﬁ rst two quarters of 2008) continued to 
experience a more severe effect on fragile economies that mostly depended on 
foreign investments and a high level of government spending backed up by an 
increased accumulation of foreign debt. The model worked as long as GDP kept 
on growing. However, under the recently experienced exogenous shock this came 
to a stop and caused a far greater level of instability, and as the more developed 
nations continue to recover (some quicker, some slower, depending on the respon-
ses from their respective governments) the less developed regions still remain in 
economic distress, hoping for a speedy re-instalment of the pre-crisis system. 
Their answer to the crisis could be seen as an opportunity to trigger much needed 
changes in their pre-crisis growth models and to adopt the needed reforms.
This ambitious book edited by Will Bartlett and Vassilis Monastiriotis deals with 
the effects of the global economic downturn on the economies of South East Eu-
rope (SEE), the positions they were in before the crisis and the policies necessary 
for them to emerge from the recession. Each country is examined on a case-by-
case basis and for each country the current policy response is evaluated, while a 
suggestion on future economic policies is given with respect to each country’s 
speciﬁ c conditions. 
The book is clearly structured and contains two main parts reﬂ ecting the indivi-
dual pieces of the authors’ viewpoints on the recession issues in each of the SEE 
countries. Part A provides a good overview of the macroeconomic situation in the 
region and all the joint effects that have exaggerated the crisis’ impact on the re-
gion along with the necessary policy responses. A link between the Greek situa-
tion and SEE countries as well as the long-run growth prospects complete the 
portrait and already present a possible answer as to why the crisis might have even 
more severe consequences for SEE countries.
In part B each country is evaluated individually by economists from within the 
region. The similarity between these countries is that they all experienced high 
growth levels in the decade preceding the crisis. The impact differed from one 
country to another, relative to the level of integration, but the consequences are 
similar – lower availability of credit, rapid decline of FDI, increasing unemploy-
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243Each chapter can be seen as an individual paper analyzing the impact of the crisis 
on a speciﬁ c country as well as all the preconditions, policies, pleas for recovery 
and lessons to be learnt. Each one of them tries to analyze its respective country 
with maximum precision. The level of analysis is quite robust as every author tries 
to determine the reasons why the crisis had (or did not have) a big impact and 
whether it was entirely the crisis to blame for the level of economic distress each 
country is experiencing or whether it has merely been a consequence of inefﬁ cient 
pre-crisis policies that the crisis only exacerbated. They also analyze the policies 
and responses to the crisis currently being undertaken and strive to offer their own 
views on what is to be done in order to reach a stable medium-run recovery. 
The book follows a pattern: the beginning of each chapter takes its respective 
country in the perspective of the entire region and then moves on to its inner issues 
trying to lead the reader to reach a conclusion on what is to be done to trigger re-
covery. The editors have organized the entire book this way, presenting at the 
beginning a full view on what is wrong with the region along with its recovery and 
growth prospects. They then assign the ﬁ rst three chapters to a closer considera-
tion of the region’s instabilities, in a wider focus. 
The level of impact the global recession had on South East Europe affected some 
countries more while others only slightly. The EU member countries and candida-
te countries seem to have experienced more severe consequences than the rest of 
region, verifying a higher level of economic integration with the EU as a possible 
cause of this. As the global ﬁ nancial situation worsened, the impact struck these 
countries indirectly as their banking systems were not exposed to toxic assets. The 
indirect effect came through a contraction of international trade, a halt of credit 
growth (due to global restriction of credit), a rapid decrease of foreign direct inve-
stment as well as a decrease of remittances from migrant workers. The current 
growth model for most of the SEE countries relied upon an expansion of domestic 
demand driven by credit expansion from banks and external funding (FDI capital 
inﬂ ows – mostly through privatization, EU assistance, remittances and debt accu-
mulation by both the citizens and the government). The inﬂ ow of these foreign 
resources led to an artiﬁ cial expansion in consumption and the creation of external 
debts, low savings and rising deﬁ cits. Such dependence made the SEE countries 
more vulnerable to external shocks. The consequences are still hurting these eco-
nomies as increasing unemployment, rising import prices and reduced access to 
credit leads to rising inequality and social turmoil around the region. The main 
lesson the book’s editors and authors imply is that the old growth model has come 
to an end and that there is an increasing need for new reforms to strengthen the 
region and make it more capable of withstanding future exogenous shocks. 
Recovery varies on the level of impact the crisis had and the relative level of inte-
gration and interdependence some countries had with developed nations (the EU 























































































35 (2) 241-251 (2011)
244 this can imply that the most developed countries within the region, namely Bulga-
ria, Croatia and Romania (EU members and a candidate) will continue to expe-
rience the recession effects for yet another year without much hopes of a quicker 
recovery unless their governments apply the needed reforms. 
Policy responses also vary and are dependent of the transmission mechanisms of 
the crisis and the level of responsiveness of each country’s respective govern-
ment. Some countries allowed the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit to rise to increase aggregate de-
mand (Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania), while others seek support from the 
IMF (Bosnia, Serbia, Romania) and some used rational monetary policies due to 
a lack of effort by the government (Croatia) and cancelled restrictions on bank 
lending to domestic enterprises in foreign currencies. The practical impact has 
been to run down domestic foreign currency reserves in the face of the collapse in 
the external supply of foreign funds. 
The policy responses currently being undertaken seem to be only temporary solu-
tions, which depend on a relatively quick return to pre-crisis conditions and growth 
models. However, the editors and the authors clearly recognize that if this doesn’t 
happen (which is likely) more fundamental reforms will be needed to ensure futu-
re economic growth in the SEE region. 
Part A of the SEE region analysis starts with chapter 2 where Ben Slay covers the 
economic and social impacts of the crisis on the entire SEE region. He observes 
the main macroeconomic indicators, which lead him to believe that the effect of 
the crisis was much less severe for the SEE countries than for other EU member 
states. However, GDP growth in the region has declined, bringing the decade of 
growth in household income and employment to an end. Fiscal expansion was 
used as the main policy instrument to deal with the recession, leading to rising ﬁ -
scal deﬁ cits. The situation may continue to worsen, as unemployment is increa-
sing and the social programs, pensions and health care programs are putting addi-
tional pressures on ﬁ scal sustainability. The recovery is dependent on higher 
export growth to support the rising demand of the EU-15 countries. Since the pace 
of recovery of the Euro area countries seems to be slow, the prospect of recovery 
for the SEE region is also in doubt. Slay additionally covers the socio-economic 
problems in the chapter and he expects them to worsen in the coming years. 
However, he uses pre-crisis data on poverty and inequality. It is hard to make clear 
inferences on this without corresponding data but he tries to get around that and 
suggests the appropriate social policies that should take place to mitigate the ef-
fects of the crisis on the poor and misfortunate. 
Peter Sanfey and Simone Zeh in chapter 3 focus on the policy dimension and 
emphasize the trade potential of the SEE countries as a way to push for growth 
again. The stable pre-crisis decade was characterized by capital inﬂ ows and credit 
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245quite some time before the pre-crisis levels of FDI and credit growth are restored. 
But the trade ﬂ ows within the region are still low and the authors suggest a strong 
re-focus on this issue as a key way to achieve economic growth again. They offer 
a new growth strategy, realizing that the old one is not practical any more, for the 
crisis highlighted the vulnerabilities of previous growth models. They put the em-
phasis on relatively low levels of intra-regional trade and analyze the reasons 
behind this (non-tariff barriers are recognized as the main culprits). A path to fa-
ster growth and a more rapid way out of the recession, at the same time developing 
a new growth model, is achievable through higher levels of trade openness. San-
fey and Zeh even set out for policymakers how this is supposed to be done; on a 
multilateral, a European or even on a unilateral level. This may not only trigger a 
way out of the recession but it may also help the Western Balkan countries quickly 
to ﬁ nish the EU accession process and create a more favourable environment to 
attract foreign investors. 
In chapter 4, Laza Kekić examines the region’s recovery prospects from the pers-
pective of the Greek crisis and its possible effects on the region. He shows weak 
growth prospects for the SEE countries and an additional risk in the potential fal-
lout from Greece (particularly for its closest trading and investment partners). He 
draws on the similarities of Greece and SEE countries concerning their common 
problems with corruption, tax evasion, unsustainable pension systems, ageing po-
pulation, etc. Most of these countries haven’t yet experienced consequences 
anything like those experienced by Greece, but the dangers of increasing vulnera-
bilities still exist for the region due to the high involvement of Greek banks (as well 
as trade relations, remittances and FDI) in certain countries (especially the nei-
ghbouring countries, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Montenegro). The banks 
are opting to reduce their exposure in the region as it is unlikely they will continue 
credit expansion very soon as the pressures from the home market may forbid them 
from further expansion. Kekić concludes that the Greek situation may indirectly 
affect the chances of further EU enlargement, causing even more difﬁ culties for 
some SEE countries whose recovery depends on quicker EU accession. 
Part B of the book covers each country individually. It starts with chapter 5 where 
Etleva Germenji measures the impact the crisis had on Albania and immediately 
infers that due to Albania’s limited integration into the global market and its low 
level of ﬁ nancial market development, the impact of the crisis only had a mode-
rate effect, keeping it relatively isolated from the ﬁ nancial meltdown. The eco-
nomy did experience secondary effects to some extent due to a reduction of remit-
tances (which account for 10% of Albania’s GDP), lower exports and slightly ti-
ghter domestic lending policies (caused by lower liquidity and higher credit risk 
of investing in the real sector). These secondary effects did have an impact on ri-
sing unemployment (especially in construction and export related industries) that 
may even lead to social turmoil due to a rising level of political instability. Throu-
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246 sing the public debt and, due to an increase in borrowing costs, found it difﬁ cult 
to raise new funds on the international capital market. Germenji denotes that the 
government decided on a ﬁ scal stimulus not only to boost demand but also in an-
ticipation of the parliamentary elections that were held in June 2009. In the end, 
this did provide a boost to economic growth as Albania turned out to be one of the 
two countries in the region that experienced GDP growth in 2009 (around 3%). 
The Bank of Albania also worked in its favour by increasing liquidity and cutting 
down interest rates. Although the economy is projected to grow over the next two 
years (implying a V shaped recovery) Germenji fears that the current political 
crisis as well as potential spillovers from the Greek economic crisis (Albania’s 
major foreign investor) may alter these growth projections. She also rightly 
doubts that the current ﬁ scal expenditure approach will be enough to eliminate the 
uncertainty over future growth. 
Anto Domazet in chapter 6 analyzes the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) 
from a political economy perspective. He observes the situation in BH as a joint 
effect of the long-lasting political crisis and the global economic recession. The 
country is in a “middle income trap”, the level of poverty is increasing, unemploy-
ment is rising, wages are falling, there is uncertainty surrounding pensions and 
social transfers and ﬁ nally there is complete lack of political ability to deal with 
the crisis as they focus more on their internal conﬂ icts. Domazet does a good job 
in explaining the complexity of Bosnia’s fragile political situation as it is impor-
tant to understand this before commencing any analysis of the BH economy and 
any exogenous shocks. He questions how long this can continue as the political 
elites are facing a collapse of the system they once strove for (he uses the term 
political capitalism). He says that changes are crucial, claiming there is now an 
opportunity simultaneously to deal with the declining economy and to reform the 
political system. Even though the situation is bad for BH, he still tries to ﬁ nd a 
glimmer of hope and a chance to overcome both the political deadlock and the 
economic downturn only if there is enough political support. A clear-cut point is 
made in the chapter: the political elites seem to be disillusioned about the actual 
causes of the crisis in BH and have adopted a “wait and copy strategy” to try and 
revive the economy in the short run (excessive government expenditure and slow 
privatisation). According to Domazet the way out of the crisis is in stimulating 
private entrepreneurship, strengthening market institutions and balancing the pu-
blic sector at a lower level until the global recovery sets the local private sector in 
motion. The problem is that Bosnia’s economy doesn’t have the strength or the 
ability to manage the crisis this way but in order to do so it must engage in a dee-
per and more painful (painful for the ethnically fractionalized elites) constitutio-
nal reform. The idea is that one cannot ﬁ ght the crisis effectively if the nation is 
already suffering from terrible mismanagement and inefﬁ ciency. Domazet how-
ever omits to stress the importance remittances have for BH in possibly alleviating 
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247Similarly to the rest of the region, the relative immaturity of the domestic capital 
market (characterized by low liquidity, insufﬁ cient transparency, etc.) postponed 
the initial crisis effects on Bulgaria, analyzed in chapter 7 by Stoyan Totev and 
Grigor Sariiski. Compared to the previous two cases, Bulgaria was much more 
integrated into the EU thus experiencing a more severe effect on its economy 
(through diminishing capital inﬂ ows). A particularly negative impact was the de-
terioration of international trade. There was a decrease in consumer demand, re-
stricted access to credit, decline of remittances, rising debt and rising unemploy-
ment. The authors recognize a ﬁ xed exchange rate as a reason for a slow recovery 
of the economy, placing additional difﬁ culties on Bulgarian exporters. They also 
examine the possible consequences to Bulgarian banks and ﬁ nancial institutions, 
foreign investment and exports, the real sector and the labour market. They tackle 
the effects on the social situation, characterized by a reduction in rent incomes, 
decrease of the propensity to consume, rising unemployment and de-capitaliza-
tion. The recovery is thus expected to be slow, particularly because of the effect 
of rapidly declining foreign investments (a key determinant of pre-crisis econo-
mic growth in Bulgaria) and a serious outﬂ ow of highly skilled labour. The au-
thors end on the positive note that the crisis might generate an indirect healing 
effect on the economy as it can speed up the needed restructuring of production 
and trade. Another positive sign is the opportunity to take resources from EU 
structural funds, an option that has not been available for Bulgaria due to high 
corruption in the previous years. The authors are fully aware of the negative im-
plications politics can create for the economy and are striving to persuade the 
reader that this needs to be changed in Bulgaria. 
Katarina Ott tackles the problems facing Croatia in Chapter 8. The characteristics 
of Croatia are similar to those of other SEE countries; decrease of GDP, increa-
sing budget deﬁ cit, high government expenditure, rising unemployment. Croatia’s 
pre-crisis situation could only extend and deepen these effects, making them long-
lasting. The current account deﬁ cit was an issue long before the crisis, and the 
same goes for a large budget deﬁ cit and consequently a level of public debt well 
above the regional average. In line with the burden of the whole book, Ott also 
points out that, like other SEE countries, Croatia failed to ﬁ ght its instabilities and 
failed to reform institutionally when the time was right. Accordingly Croatia now 
has much less breathing space to tolerate increased public expenditures; instead it 
must engage in budget cuts to curtail the deﬁ cits and repay its debts. The problem 
here is lack of political incentive to do so as these policies are highly unpopular 
and can lead to electoral defeat (even though a plausible economic recovery pro-
gram was made, the biggest issue is its implementation). Ott develops the issue of 
the democratic deﬁ cit, which limits the effectiveness of any recovery program. 
The voters are not ready to make sacriﬁ ces. Her suggestion is that the citizens 
should “take the medicine” in order for the country to achieve a quicker economic 
recovery and future prosperity. However, even if the citizens are ready to do this, 
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248 veterans, unions, pensioners, coalition partners, etc.) and is reluctant to carry out 
its own reforms, hoping that the status quo will last long enough for them to ensu-
re another election success. Finally, Ott recognizes that EU membership and the 
fulﬁ lment of the Economic Recovery Programme (if properly implemented, not 
selectively which has been the case so far) are the medium run paths out of the 
crisis. None of these present a short run solution but for Croatia – there is no short 
run solution. 
Petrit Gashi in chapter 9 on Kosovo focuses on the degree of economic integra-
tion. He investigates whether the crisis had any adverse impact on Kosovo. Al-
though Kosovo was not immune to the effects of the crisis and international imba-
lances, the low level of economic integration of this newly formed country (that is 
yet to experience its own transition) made it experience only limited effects of the 
global recession and avoiding its full impact. The only effect was on decreasing 
trade and the level of remittances (especially because Kosovar unskilled migrants 
abroad are the most likely to suffer downturns in the labour market). And although 
the crisis seems to have dodged Kosovo, the effects might be expected to arrive 
soon enough to disrupt this infant economy. It is suffering from typical economic 
problems all newly formed countries suffer – a huge trade deﬁ cit, chronic unem-
ployment and a major reliance on remittances. Kosovo could become an example 
of a country upon which the crisis had the smallest direct impact, but due to a lack 
of investment incentives in the region it may bear unexpected consequences. The 
general conclusion Gashi draws is that although a low level of integration has 
been the main factor behind mitigating the crisis effects it can prove to be the 
biggest barrier to Kosovo’s future economic development.
Trajko Slaveski in chapter 10 notes that according to the IMF the crisis had a 
small impact on Macedonia due to a swiftly introduced set of macroeconomic 
policies (a fall in GDP of just 1%). Another good reason might be the fact that 
Macedonia experienced a slow transition that delayed growth until 2005. It didn’t, 
in the way of the other transitional economies, experience large capital inﬂ ows 
that might have spurred growth but brought trouble later on. It was spared from an 
excess property bubble and was able to avoid the crisis’ most severe consequences 
but this also helped them realize that the current model of the economy needs a 
change. Structural reforms (among the top 10 fastest reformers), a low level of 
public debt and sensible monetary policies (ensuring a stable banking system) 
enabled the economy to adapt to the crisis with limited adverse effects on the go-
vernment’s ﬁ scal position, enabling a ﬁ scal stimulus without a corresponding high 
increase of the deﬁ cit. The government also engaged in tax cuts as another way to 
stimulate the economy, combining them with ﬁ scal expansion to create an even 
better effect. However, Macedonia is not without problems. The recovery seems 
to be rather slow due to the unfavourable structure of its exports. The negotiations 
with the EU are at a stand-still due to the political dispute Macedonia is having 
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249on Macedonia may trigger additional unfavourable effects. The current growth 
model for Macedonia came to an end with this recession, in much the same way it 
did for other SEE countries. Slaveski suggests that greater emphasis must be put 
on private capital inﬂ ows directed towards an increase of supply in the tradable 
goods sector and more efﬁ cient use of the EU pre-accession funds. 
In chapter 11, Veselin Vukotić tries to explain the lack of optimism that struck the 
Montenegro economy just around when the crisis struck. He starts his analysis 
even before Montenegrin independence, up until the post-crisis consequences. 
From the 1990s Montenegro started to develop its own new economic system 
based on the free market idea. This opened the economy to foreign investments, 
decreased tax rates, introduced the Deutsche Mark as legal tender (replaced by the 
euro in 2002), and enabled the protection of property rights and the enforcement 
of contracts. The reaction of this small open economy, especially after the 2006 
independence was striking – the fastest growth in the region, substantially decrea-
sed unemployment and foreign debt, low, stable inﬂ ation and huge FDI inﬂ ows. 
The start of the crisis in 2008 inﬂ uenced an economic stagnation from that point 
on. Another contributing factor was the abandoning of the previously set free 
market economic strategy in 2007, as the government put a stop to several priva-
tization projects sending a negative signal to investors. Vukotić highlights the 
importance of will and courage as economic factors without which deeper struc-
tural problems will arise. Large public sector employment, a lower export capaci-
ty of the economy and a decline of high inﬂ ows of foreign investments increased 
the vulnerability of the Montenegro economy. The challenges facing Montenegro 
revolve around the issue of rethinking economic policy. Vukotić argues against 
increasing state interventionism as this is unlikely to help a small open economy. 
Montenegro should rather focus on how to reinstate a favourable environment for 
entrepreneurs and build its growth on the continuation of liberal economic poli-
cies with reduced inﬂ uence of the state and future employment being more depen-
dent on the private sector. 
Romania experienced particularly strong effects of the crisis. Ileana Tache and 
Cristina Neesham cover this in chapter 12 and focus on pre-existing vulnerabili-
ties that were exacerbated by the crisis, pointing out that Romania’s downturn is 
not all due to the global recession. They examine the negative effects of the pre-
crisis growth model and how this affected the appreciation of domestic currency, 
increasing the country’s vulnerability. They offer an insightful causal relationship 
on how the macroeconomic effects of an inefﬁ cient growth model caused the 
country to be more vulnerable to external shocks. The irresponsible ﬁ scal policy 
created additional pressures, as when the recession struck, Romania already had a 
budgetary crisis to handle. They argue that it would have been much easier for 
Romania if they had not had such a large public deﬁ cit. Domestic policies were 
the most responsible for the even stronger effect of the global recession on the 
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250 and Neesham expect a slow recovery, as they question the policymakers’ incenti-
ves to apply the needed economic policies. They suggest Romania should reduce 
interest rates, try to increase savings and above all ensure a sustainable ﬁ scal po-
sition and public fund management (allocation based on efﬁ ciency). They also 
urge structural reforms (social security, education and R&D) in order for the 
country to remain competitive on the global market and catch up with the EU-15 
level of income. 
In chapter 13 Pavle Petrović starts with examining the pre-crisis economic imba-
lances in Serbia which were, as in other SEE countries, only deepened by the 
crisis. High growth rates led by large inﬂ ows of capital resulted in large external 
deﬁ cits implying overconsumption and overinvestment in Serbia. Petrović sugge-
sts that due to this overheating, the Serbian economy became more vulnerable to 
external shocks. During the onset of the crisis the inﬂ ow of foreign credit stopped, 
there was a rapid decline in exports causing a deep drop of aggregate demand and 
a rise in the unemployment rate. However due to the severe drop in imports and a 
large but well-managed depreciation of the currency Serbia experienced only a 
modest decrease of GDP, modest, at least, compared to other countries in the re-
gion. He draws an interesting comparison between Croatia and Serbia in this case 
saying that Croatia defended its currency much more strongly, allowing only for 
minor depreciation but at the same time experienced a much larger drop in output. 
Petrović further examines and evaluates the monetary and ﬁ scal policy responses 
and points out how the decisive factor was prior support from the IMF that helped 
Serbia mitigate the full crisis effect somewhat successfully. This €3 billion stand-
by arrangement combined with the Vienna Agreement prevented the collapse of 
the currency and backed the banking sector. Concerning ﬁ scal policy, Petrović 
says that during the pre-crisis period, despite increasing revenues, the deﬁ cit was 
too large, leading to increasing vulnerability in times of crisis, when the revenues 
could be expected to drop. The Serbian government had to freeze public sector 
wages and pensions and cut expenditures so as not to increase the deﬁ cit too much, 
all in accordance with the IMF policies. However the deﬁ cits are still increasing, 
thus raising the public debt and providing a threat to Serbia’s sustainable reco-
very. In the medium run, Petrović suggests, Serbia should tackle the budget deﬁ cit 
and focus on boosting its competitiveness bringing about an export-led recovery. 
There is however a political danger that he recognizes; by increasing expenditures 
to capture votes, the forthcoming elections may extend the budget deﬁ cit even 
further. 
The book is intellectually stimulating as it not only offers differing views on how 
to approach recovery, it also discusses the various interpretations of the main 
causes of the crisis. Although the authors agree that most of the countries expe-
rienced similar shocks and had similar pre-conditions leading up to a recession 
more severe than hoped for, they still differentiate in style, focus, solutions, and 
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251parable, either in offering solutions or in explaining the reasons behind the indi-
rect crisis effects. The editors try to stay impartial providing freedom to the au-
thors to express fully their own views in order to create an effect of diversity in the 
experiences of these somewhat similar countries. 
From such an approach the reader might conclude that different countries require 
different measures and that it would be exciting to enter the debate on expansion 
vs. austerity in the Balkan case. The region is still mostly occupied with problems 
of transition and post-socialist institutionalisation. This book successfully diver-
ges from this debate and introduces a new one – one that should become more 
present in everyday economic thinking of the SEE countries. If the book were to 
achieve only a slight contribution towards this enhancement of ideas, it would 
already present an improvement. Due to limitations of space, there is still relative 
unclarity in the opposing views of how the SEE countries should handle the situa-
tion. A better approach perhaps would be to introduce opposing but sensible solu-
tions in each case and let the reader’s curiosity choose a standpoint from which his 
or her conclusions can be drawn. Although the book was probably designed with 
the idea that it was pioneering research on the crisis in this historically and cultu-
rally unique area, the editors, as well as their team of authors, should consider 
broadening the subject to bring about a much needed boost of economic knowle-
dge in the SEE area, enabling it to reach a wider audience, the policymakers in 
particular. 
If the insights from the book reached the policymakers instead of remaining only 
in the horizon of the academics, then it might just have the effect the editors and 
the authors were hoping for. If not, it will remain another excellent economic 
analysis of the pre- and post-crisis situation and great reading for anyone intere-
sted not only in how the crisis hit the SEE countries but also in their economic 
problems in general, and how to offer a proper solution to resolve these pro-
blems. 
